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Abstract:  Militaries commonly require recruits to pass a test that measures aptitude for 
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"Of every one hundred men in battle, ten should not even be there.  Eighty are nothing 
but targets. Nine are the real fighters, we are lucky to have them since they make the 
battle. Ah, but the one—one is the Warrior—and he brings the others home.“ 




SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 
It is widely understood that the most desirable candidates for military service are 
intelligent and well educated.
2
 It is, however, generally overlooked that recruits’ motivation 
for service matters as well.  Those that really want to serve in the military are more likely to 
perform well, avoid disciplinary problems, and re-enlist following completion of their initial 
service commitment.
3
  The problem is that, unlike intelligence and educational attainment, it 
is effectively impossible to identify potential recruits’ true level of motivation when they 
wander in to speak with a recruiter.   
Part of the reason why it is difficult to identify recruit motivation is that young people 
volunteer to serve in the military for a remarkably wide variety of reasons.  Some are 
primarily motivated by the military’s offer of pay and benefits.  Others are drawn to the 
military due to a sense of adventure, or as an award winning Swedish recruitment video 
suggests, by “an opportunity to emerge from the water holding a weird futuristic weapon.”4  
Yet others see military service as an expression of their sexual identity, taking to heart Betty 
Boop’s admonishment: “don’t be a sissy, join the army and get a kissy!”5 Still others are 
drawn to service due to proud family traditions or, alternatively, by the need to get away from 
their families. Some aren’t even really sure why they want to serve in the armed forces.  And 
then there are those who actually want to serve their country.   
In this paper, we illustrate the influence of unobservable variation in recruit motivation 
on the volunteer mobilization of military personnel, and the important and surprising role that 
aptitude testing plays in screening out low-motivation recruits.  We consider a pool of 
potential recruits.  The recruits differ in terms of their civilian reservation wages (a proxy of 
the recruit’s aptitude for military service) and in terms of whether they have a “taste” for 
military service.  We assume that there is no correlation between reservation wages and tastes.  
We then identify the characteristics of those who will volunteer for service at any given wage 
level.  Following that, we introduce a simple test similar to the U.S. Armed Forces’ “Armed 
Forces Qualification Test” (AFQT) that perfectly reveals a potential recruit’s reservation 
wage, and identify the combinations of wage and minimum test score that achieve different 
levels of military capability at the least cost.   
Our main result is that aptitude testing – while shedding no light directly on recruit 
motivation – acts as a device for screening out low motivation recruits when used in 
conjunction with wages.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to identify this as 
a possibility.  In addition, our analysis challenges the conventional wisdom regarding a 
number of topics in military planning and defense economics, such as the widely held beliefs 
that declining test standards are evidence of eroding military capability and that military 
conscription is socially inequitable.   
This paper is closely related to a literature that considers the role of non-pecuniary 
benefits in the compensation of workers and agents.  Influential and/or recent papers in this 
literature include Rosen (1986), Francois (2000), Dixit (2001), Murdock (2002), Benabou and 
Tirole (2003), Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Delfgaauw and 
Dur (2007), Makris (2009), and Arce (2012).   
The papers in this literature consider a number of different definitions of motivation.  
Some papers model motivation as being derived by the pleasure of doing a job that is fun or 
interesting.  Other papers consider situations where workers may be motivated by a desire to 
maintain high ethical standards or enhance their self-esteem or sense of identity.  Still other 
papers consider workers deeply committed to the mission that their employer is pursuing, such 
as education, scientific advancement, justice, or national security.  
In this paper, we aren’t concerned with what causes greater motivation, but rather what 
is caused by greater motivation.   We assume only that “motivated people probably work 
harder, which increases output, and because people derive utility from the job, they may be 
willing to work for a lower wage”6 – an assumption made by virtually all papers in this 
literature.   
Many papers in this literature generally assume that agent motivation is directly 
observable, but a number of papers consider situations where agent motivation is 
unobservable, resulting in problems of adverse selection. .Handy and Katz (1998), Delfgaauw 
and Dur (2007,) and Arce (2012) consider the role that wage offers can play in identifying 
highly motivated job candidates.  Handy and Katz (1997) find that in a labor market where 
workers vary in terms of both motivation and ability, low wage offers weed out unmotivated 
candidates and can result in the recruitment of workers that are both more talented and more 
motivated.  Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) focus on a labor market where workers vary only in 
terms of motivation and candidates incur costs in applying for jobs. They find that while low 
wage offers increase the likelihood that candidates will be highly motivated, they also increase 
the risk that positions will go unfilled. Arce (2012) considers employers who screen for 
motivation by offering a menu of contracts with different weightings of fixed wage and 
compensation contingent on effort. He finds that highly motivated workers will prefer 
contracts with little or no contingent compensation.     
This paper follows Handy and Katz (1997) in assuming that job candidates differ un-
observably in terms of both ability and motivation.  The main contribution of this paper is that 
it illustrates that it is possible to overcome problems of adverse selection in agent motivation 
at least partially by exploiting intelligence tests that offer no direct information regarding 
agents’ level of enthusiasm.  
Due to its focus on unobservable recruit characteristics, this paper is also tangentially 
related to a literature that focuses on the role of asymmetric information in the recruitment of 
military manpower. Recent papers in this literature include Perri (2010), Berck and Lipow 
(2011), Lipow and Simon (2011), and Perri (2012).  Excellent reviews of earlier research on 
this subject can be found in Williams and Gilroy (2006) and Asch, Hosek, and Warner (2007). 
The paper is organized into four sections.  In Section Two, we introduce the model’s 
basic architecture and evaluate the characteristics of a volunteer system in the absence of 
aptitude testing.  In Section Three, we evaluate the characteristics of a volunteer system where 
a wage is offered and all those who volunteer and “pass” an aptitude test are accepted for 
service.  Section Four concludes the paper with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for military planning and defense economics.   
  
SECTION TWO: A MODEL OF VOLUNTEER MILITARY MANPOWER 
MOBILIZATION 
Consider a pool of potential recruits for military service.  We assume without loss of 
generality that the size of this pool is 1.  Each of these potential recruits can earn a wage, z, if 
they decline to enlist and instead enter the civilian labor market.  The value of z differs from 
individual to individual, and acts as a proxy for the potential recruit’s aptitude for military 
service.  Let us assume that z ~ U[0,1].  For now, we also assume that each individual’s value 
of z is known only to that potential recruit. 
Potential recruits also differ in terms of their motivation to serve in the military.  We 
assume that there are two types of potential recruit.  One type – the highly motivated - enjoys 
some non-pecuniary benefit from serving in the military Let k represent the equivalent 
monetary value of this benefit, while θ represents the proportion of potential recruits that are 
highly motivated to serve in the military.  The other type of potential recruit – the unmotivated 
– enjoys no non-pecuniary benefits from military service.  For this type, military service is 
simply another job, and they measure the desirability of that job relative to civilian 
employment based solely on the wages offered.  We also assume that motivation is 
uncorrelated with z. 
Now, let us consider a simple – even naïve - volunteer system for the mobilization of 
military manpower.  In this system, the military simply sets a wage w, 0 1w  .  There are no 
tests or screenings of potential recruits.  Any potential recruit who observes w and decides to 
volunteer joins the military and receives w as his or her wage.  We assume that each potential 
recruit makes the decision which will maximize his or her total benefit, that is, those left better 
off by joining the military are those that volunteer.  For the unmotivated, anyone whose 
civilian wage z is less than w will join the military.  For the highly motivated, anyone whose 
reservation wage is less than w + k will join. 
Let N be the total number of potential recruits who join the military, while z  is the 
average reservation wage of those that serve in the military, and r is the proportion of those 
that serve who are highly motivated to do so.  Given the response of potential recruits of both 
types to the wage offer, as well as our assumptions that z is uniformly distributed and that 
motivation is uncorrelated with z, it is straightforward to solve for N , r , and z  in terms of w, 
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Derivations for (1)-(3) are given in the Appendix.  Two expressions are given for each of 
these variables, since all the highly motivated potential recruits - regardless of their civilian 
wage – will have joined the military by the time w reaches 1-k.   
In Figure 1, the relationships between w and N, z , and  r are illustrated graphically.  
The relationships in Figure 1 have been drawn assuming that k = .2 and θ = .4, but 
qualitatively, the graphs will look similar for 0 < θ < .5 and 0 < k < 1.  The average aptitude 
curve is qualitatively different when θ is between .5 and 1, as discussed below. 
***INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
The relationships graphed in Figure 1 define the decision space for defense planners 
grappling with the volunteer mobilization of military manpower.  Three relationships govern 
the planners’ choices.  First, there is a clear trade-off between numbers, aptitude, and 
motivation.  Higher wages always result in a larger and (almost always) higher aptitude 
military, but progressively lower the proportion of recruits who are highly motivated to serve.   
The second is that there is an important kink point where w = 1 - k. Up till that point, 
each incremental increase in w induces the enlistment of two distinct types of recruit.  One 
type is highly motivated and has a relatively high value of z.  The other type is unmotivated 
and has a relatively low value of z.  At w = 1 – k, however, the very last remaining high 
motivation potential recruit enlists.  As a result, from that point on, every incremental increase 
in the wage attracts a smaller number of additional recruits and none of those recruits are 
highly motivated. 
Finally, the relationship between z  and w depends on the value of θ. When the 
military is very small, offering higher wages need not enhance the average aptitude of recruits.  
The reason is that at w = 0, only highly motivated potential recruits join the military.  Any 
highly motivated volunteer whose civilian wage is less than k will volunteer.  As a result, the 
average value of z for those serving in the military is k/2.  Now, as we discussed above, an 
incremental increase in w would, at that point, attract two distinct types of volunteer.  One 
type would be highly motivated and have a value of z = k.  The other type would be 
unmotivated and have z = 0.  The average value of z for the incremental volunteers would be 
θz.  As a result, if θ < .5, then z would be declining as a result of the incremental increase in 
w.  Should θ be greater than .5, then the average aptitude of recruits would monotonically 
increase with the wage.  
Now, we continue the analysis by following Berck and Lipow (2011) in assuming a 
function for the production of defense capability of form  Q Nzr

 .  Using this function, we 
determine the value of w, w*, that provides the desired levels of capability at minimum cost. 
We ignore capital expenditures, training, and operating expenses, and assume that the cost 
function is given by wN, the military’s wage bill.  Figure 2 shows w* and total cost as a 
function of q, for the case where α = 1/3, 0.2k  , and 0.2   (other sets of parameter values 
do not yield qualitatively different results).  The components of Q are determined using (1)-(3) 
as previously. 
***INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 Figure 2 holds few surprises.  The only way to boost defense capability is obviously to 
raise the wage, and the marginal cost of military capability is increasing, since the higher 
wage that attracts each new recruit is also paid to all those already in uniform.  The wage and 
force size curves are parallel for most of the graph, because a marginal increase in the wage 
leads to a corresponding marginal increase in the force size.  When w = .8, however, the kink 
point mentioned above is reached – all those highly motivated to serve are now in the military.  
At that point, incremental increases in the wage attract only unmotivated recruits, and thus 
produce far less additional defense capability.  Until w = 1, the average aptitude of the 
marginal recruit is actually a bit lower than the recruits that volunteered when w reached .8 
and a highly motivated recruit with z = 1 showed up and began what promised to be a stellar 
military career. 
 
SECTION THREE: EXPLOITING APTITUDE TESTS IN THE RECRUITMENT 
PROCESS 
In this section, we will assume that the military can give potential recruits a test similar 
to the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) used in the United States.  We will assume 
that this test will perfectly identify each recruit’s level of z.7  The test, however, will not 
directly shed any light on the potential recruit’s level of motivation.  We also assume that the 
potential recruit’s test score cannot be used to adjust the wage she is offered by the military.8  
All recruits must earn the same wage.
9
  
The test will be used solely to determine whether a recruit is accepted into the military.  
Let t equal the cut-off test score potential recruits must attain if they are to join the armed 
forces.  We assume that w t k  , which ensures a force size greater than zero.   
As in Section Two, it is helpful to express N, r, and z  in terms of t and w.  In the case 
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As before, the formulation of (4)-(9) is facilitated by determining expressions for the 
number of motivated and unmotivated recruits who will join the military.  When t w ,  
  1 w t   unmotivated recruits will join, and  w k t    motivated recruits will join if 
1w k  ;  1 t   motivated recruits otherwise.  When t w , no unmotivated recruits will 
join, and the expressions for the number of motivated recruits remain the same. 
Let t* be the test score that yields the desired levels of capability at minimum cost, 
while all other variables, functional forms, and assumed parameters remain as they were in 
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where q is the desired level of output, and N, z , and r are determined as shown above in (4)-
(9).  Unfortunately, identifying closed-form expressions for w* and t* is effectively 
impossible, but (10) can be solved numerically using optimization software.  The results are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
***INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
Figure 3 illustrates a rich inter-action between wages and test scores in producing 
military capability at the least cost, and suggests a typology of volunteer militaries.  For the 
lowest levels of military capability, it makes sense to field a “low w” force by offering a wage 
near zero. This force is staffed by highly motivated recruits with low values of z.   
As greater capability is required, however, the only way to strengthen the force is by 
introducing a positive wage.  This wage attracts two types of new recruit.  One type of new 
recruit has a higher value of z than anyone currently in the military.  This type is highly 
motivated to serve, but refrained from volunteering at a low wage because of his or her 
relatively high civilian earning prospects.  The other type has no motivation to serve and also 
has a lower level of z than those currently serving in the military.  This type sees the low wage 
offered by the military as very attractive relative to civilian prospects.  Furthermore, given the 
assumption that θ = .2, for every new recruit of the highly desirable first type there are four 
new recruits of the highly undesirable second type.  In order to prevent these low quality 
recruits from diluting the force’s average levels of aptitude and motivation, the military 
introduces a minimum aptitude level for recruits. This screens out the four new recruits of the 
second type, but also eliminates one highly motivated recruit who had a minimal value of z. 
The net result is that the military’s size remains constant and its level of motivation remains 
high, but recruits’ average level of aptitude increases. 
This process continues until the point where the wage and the minimum value of z for 
those accepted are now set at .8 and the military is attracting highly motivated recruits with a 
reservation wage of as high as one. This military is now a small force of exceptionally capable 
and highly motivated personnel - a “high t/high w” force staffed with SEALs.   
Now, should greater military capability be required than the level provided by this elite 
force, there are two possible approaches: (i) lower test standards; or (ii) raise the wage.  
Initially, lowering test scores is unambiguously the preferable option.  Both alternatives result 
in new recruits of roughly the same level of aptitude – about .8 or so.  Lowering entry 
standards, however, adds some highly motivated recruits, while raising the wage does not. 
Furthermore, when wages are raised, the additional wage is given not only to the new recruit, 
but to all other recruits as well.  These considerations assure that the most cost-effective 
method of increasing capability is to lower test standards as a military builds up beyond the 
capability produced by a small elite force.   
As minimum test scores decline, however, new recruits mobilized through lower 
standards increasingly pull down the force’s average level of aptitude.  Eventually, it becomes 
attractive to begin raising wages as well in order to stem the deterioration in average aptitude.  
This continues until the point where the wage equals one. The result is a “low t/high w” force - 
a mass military with great variation in recruit aptitude and motivation levels.  
SECTION FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The widespread exploitation of aptitude testing as a manpower screening tool for 
militaries should hardly be surprising.  Such screening allows militaries to achieve required 
levels of capability at lower cost. To illustrate this, Table 1 compares the cost of producing 
different levels of defense capability for militaries with and without testing for the functional 
forms and assumed parameters exploited in this paper. 
 
Table 1.  Optimal parameter levels and costs to produce various levels of capability. 






No Testing, q=0.2 .15 - .19 .11 .37 .03 
No Testing, q=0.3 .40 - .44 .23 .27 .18 
No Testing, q=0.4 .68 - .72 .36 .24 .49 
Testing, q=0.2 .10 .10 .04 .20 1.00 .00 
Testing, q=0.3 .59 .59 .04 .69 1.00 .02 
Testing, q=0.4 .80 .54 .30 .70 .31 .24 
 
 
As can be seen, testing results in more cost-efficient outcomes.  For each level of capability, 
the volunteer force required is substantially smaller and of higher quality with testing than it is 
in the absence of testing.   
What we believe to be significant and surprising, however, is that this higher quality 
doesn’t manifest itself only in terms of greater average aptitude but also in higher – indeed 
much higher - average levels of motivation.  In other words, aptitude testing is not only useful 
in screening out recruits of low aptitude.  When used in conjunction with a wage offer, it plays 
a critical role in screening out recruits of low motivation, and this is the case even though 
testing does not measure motivation and there is no tell-tale correlation between aptitude and 
motivation.     
In addition to offering this basic insight regarding the role of aptitude testing in 
screening out low motivation military recruits, our analysis challenges the conventional 
wisdom regarding two issues in defense manpower policy.  The first is how to interpret a 
decline in the military’s minimum aptitude standards. 
The consensus view of the role played by the minimum aptitude standards is that they 
are there to screen out potential recruits ill-suited for military service: “the fundamental 
purpose of entry screening is the elimination of ‘bad risks’ or men who could not meet the 
severe demands of war.”10  As such, evidence that recruitment standards are declining is 
generally taken as prima facie evidence that a military is “in trouble” or that readiness is at 
risk.  For example, a 2008 analysis in Slate breathlessly comments that “the Army is lowering 
recruitment standards to levels not seen in at least two decades, and the implications are severe—not 
only for the future of the Army, but also for the direction of U.S. foreign policy.”11 
Our analysis suggests something very different.  Elite militaries, while a very cost-
efficient way of producing a low level of defense capability, are likely to be too small to 
prevail in large conflicts.  Reducing minimum recruitment standards may simply be the most 
cost-efficient route to enhance defense capability when security conditions have deteriorated.  
The historical record seems consistent with our hypothesis: “with each mobilization for war or 
other national emergency, voluntary enlistment and induction standards have been lowered.”12 
Second, let us consider the implications of our analysis for understanding the impact of 
military conscription on social equity and income distribution.  It is widely believed that the 
draft exacerbates problems of social equity.  For example, Asch et al. (2010) writes that 
“conscription promotes a less equal distribution of income and tends to place the burden of 
paying for national defense on lower income groups.”13  This certainly dovetails with the 
public perception of the socio-economic impact of the Vietnam era draft in the U.S., where 
more advantaged youth received college deferments while less educated young people were 
conscripted and paid low wages.   
Our analysis suggests, however, that cost-effective volunteer armies are likely to 
screen out recruits of low aptitude, while paying most of those who do get accepted for service 
a higher wage than they would have earned as civilians.  Reliance on such a force is also 
socially regressive.  Instead of conscripting the less capable and paying them “below market” 
wages, the volunteer military may instead be recruiting the more capable and paying them 
“above market” wages while screening out less capable volunteers.  
Consider the major wars fought by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq.  These 
conflicts have been waged with volunteers – but who exactly are these volunteers, and how 
much do they get paid?  According to a recent analysis, “recruit data support the finding that 
U.S. military recruits are more similar than dissimilar to the American youth population. The 
slight differences are that wartime U.S. military enlistees are better educated, wealthier, and 
more rural on average than their civilian peers.”14  How much do these recruits get paid?  A 
typical volunteer with a three year commitment can expect to earn $20,000 a year, while 
receiving free housing, food, and medical benefits worth about $5,000 - $10,000 more.  In 
addition, the volunteer will receive $70,000 or so in college benefits, as well as an enlistment 
bonus of up to $40,000.  Compare that to the most recent estimates of the average gross 
income of an 18 year old high school graduate – about $20,000 per year.  The reality is that 18 




Hence, the right question to ask in terms of manpower policy and social equity is not 
whether the Vietnam era draft was regressive (it clearly was), but whether the draft was more 
regressive than what would have resulted had the Vietnam war been fought by highly paid and 
highly educated volunteers such as those that are fighting today in central Asia.  Our analysis 
suggests that the answer to that question is far from clear. 
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Figure 1: Force characteristics by wage, with k = 0.2 and θ = 0.4. 
 
Figure 2: Wage required to achieve a given defense capability at least cost. 
 
Figure 3: Combinations of wage and minimum test score that produce a given defense 






 To derive (1)-(3), it is helpful first to construct expressions for the number of 
motivated and unmotivated recruits who will choose to join the military, denoted as N   and 
0N , respectively.  The number of motivated individuals in the pool of potential recruits is  , 
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 wage does not exceed the total benefit (s)he would receive from joining.  Since z ~ U[0,1], 
there are  w k   such individuals if 1w k  , and   such individuals if 1w k  .  Thus: 
  ,  1
,  1








  .                                               (A-1)
 
The number of unmotivated individuals in the pool of potential recruits is 1  , and each of 
these individuals will join if and only if z w , that is, his or her reservation wage does not 
exceed the wage (s)he would receive from joining.  Again, z ~ U[0,1].  Thus, there are 
 1 w  such individuals: 
 0 1N w  .                                                        (A-2) 
Given (A-1) and (A-2), we can derive expressions for N , r , and z , as shown by (1), (2), and 
(3), respectively. 
 
Derivation of (1): 
 
N  is simply the sum of N   and 0N , as given by (A-1) and (A-2).  In the case where 
1w k  ,  N w k    and  0 1N w  .  Thus, 
   1N w k w
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,                                             (A-3) 
which is the first expression in (1). 














,                                                    (A-4) 
which gives us the second expression in (1). 
 
Derivation of (2): 
 




.  In the case where 
1w k  ,  N w k    and N w k  .  Thus,  
 w k w k
r






,                                             (A-5) 
which is the first expression in (2). 








,                                                    (A-6) 
which is the second expression in (2). 
 
Derivation of (3): 
 
We can compute z  as a weighted average of the average reservation wages of the motivated 
and unmotivated recruits who choose to join, where the weights are r  and 1 r , respectively.  
Since z is distributed uniformally, the average reservation wage of the unmotivated recruits 
 who choose to join is w/2.  The average reservation wage of the motivated recruits who 
choose to join is (w+k)/2 if 1w k  , and 1/2 otherwise. 
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which establishes the first expression in (3). 
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which establishes the second expression in (3). 
